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DEFAMATION OR DISCOURSE?: 
RETHINKING THE PUBLIC FIGURE 
DOCTRINE ON THE INTERNET†
The expansive accessibility provided by the Internet has undoub-
tedly increased the ability of users to disseminate their ideas and opi-
nions to wider audiences.
 
INTRODUCTION 
Freedom of speech is one of the core liberties guaranteed to our 
citizens, immortalized in the Constitution and fiercely defended 
throughout history. This freedom has traditionally included expression 
through print, speech and even conduct. However, technological ad-
vancements, coupled with a substantial increase in access to the Inter-
net, have created an unprecedented medium of expression with vir-
tually no limits on the dissemination of ideas. In its early stages the 
Internet provided users with limited functions like access to email, 
messaging with friends and chat room dialogues, but this landscape 
has changed dramatically with the introduction of thread messaging, 
blogging and social networking sites. Virtually every person with a 
computer has the opportunity to engage in some form of online dis-
course—whether it be reconnecting with friends, making social com-
mentary or engaging in politically volatile debates.  
1
  
 †  Awarded Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet Note of the Year, as 
selected by the Volume 1 Editorial Board. 
 1 See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse 
in Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 894-95 (2000) (“One of the most significant ways 
in which the Internet promises to change the nature of public discourse is by allowing 
more participants to engage in the public discussion and debate. The Internet gives 
citizens inexpensive access to a medium of mass communication and therefore trans-
forms every citizen into a potential ‘publisher’ of information for First Amendment 
purposes.”) [hereinafter Lidsky, Silencing John Doe]; see also Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky 
& Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences and Anonymous Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1537, 1556 (2007) (describing how online anonymity has expanded public 
discussion to an unprecedented level).  
 Further, many users rely on the anonymity 
that the Internet easily provides to express controversial, yet impor-
tant, ideas that would otherwise bring disrepute. While online ano-
nymity is valuable as it encourages the speaker to distribute his ideas 
freely, it is also dangerous as it widens the potential for cognizable 
legal harm to individuals in the form of online defamation. Thus, a 
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problem arises in determining how the law should strike the proper 
balance between the individual’s right to speak anonymously and the 
plaintiff’s right to recover for reputational injury. 
Further complicating the issue for courts are the civil procedure 
questions that arise from a lawsuit against an anonymous defamer. For 
instance, even assuming a person has a colorable claim for defama-
tion, on whom does a plaintiff serve the summons when the speaker is 
anonymous? Plaintiffs generally have only one option: issue a John 
Doe Subpoena to the Internet Service Provider (ISP) and hope that the 
court will compel the disclosure of the identity of the anonymous 
speaker. Courts struggle, however, with the tension between a defen-
dant’s right to speak freely and anonymously under the First Amend-
ment, and a plaintiff’s right to recover for cognizable harms to his 
reputation arising from the defamatory statements.2 This is important 
because in determining whether or not to compel the revelation of a 
defendant’s identity, courts evaluate the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s 
evidence against the backdrop of the speaker’s Constitutional, yet 
qualified, right to anonymous speech.3
Further complicating the issue is the application of the traditional 
public figure doctrine in the context of online defamation. Typically, 
the right to recover for defamation is determined by a two-part analy-
sis that takes into consideration both the status of the plaintiff—as a 
private figure or public figure—and the harms created from the sub-
stance of the statements. The Supreme Court recognizes that the bur-
den of proof for a defamation claim is less for a private individual 
 The development of a uniform 
standard is imperative both to inform a potential plaintiff of his or her 
expected evidentiary burden and to provide online users with some 
guidance as to whether certain conduct will be subjected to liability. 
Further, without the clarity provided by a uniform standard, there is a 
significant risk that some forms of speech will be chilled, as potential 
online posters will refrain from speaking because they are unclear 
about the scope of their online rights.  
  
 2 See, e.g., In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc. (In re AOL), 
No. 40570, 2000 WL 1210372, at *8 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 2000), rev’d on other 
grounds sub nom. Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 
377 (Va. 2001) (adopting a “good faith” standard); Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescan-
dy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 579 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (adopting a “motion to dismiss” stan-
dard); Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No.3, 775 A.2d 756, 760-61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2001) (adopting a “prima facie” standard with an additional Constitutional ba-
lancing factor); Krinksy v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 244 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) 
(adopting the Dendrite “prima facie” standard, but eliminating the Constitutional 
balancing). 
 3 See Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 1, at 1599 (describing the right to speak 
anonymously as a “qualified privilege” in the context of defamation). 
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than for a person who can be categorized as a public figure.4 While 
the Court has not explicitly identified a set of concrete factors to de-
termine whether someone is a public figure, it is clear that the volun-
tary aspect of the plaintiff’s position is relevant to the analysis.5 For 
example, the mayor of a city is a public official because he has volun-
tarily assumed the role by choosing to run for office, and as a conse-
quence of his position, he is also susceptible to important political 
discourse. This discourse may lead to criticism of the mayor’s charac-
ter, reputation and ability to do his job. Under the public figure doc-
trine, if the mayor sought recovery for defamation, he would be sub-
ject to a heightened standard of proof to show that the defendant acted 
with “actual malice”—that the speaker knew the statement was false 
or simply did not care whether it was false or not.6 In addition to vo-
luntariness, the Court also justifies this heightened standard by recog-
nizing that a public figure often has greater access to channels of 
communication that can be used to combat the defamatory speech 
than a private individual.7
Beyond the public figure doctrine, a minority of justices have ar-
gued that even some private individuals should be subject to the 
heightened actual malice standard if they have voluntarily engaged in 
conduct that involves a general or public issue.
  
8
The traditional public figure doctrine, as formulated through Su-
preme Court jurisprudence, is unable to meet the needs of the Internet. 
In an age where virtually anyone can create an online profile and a 
video can go “viral” in a matter of hours, it is exceedingly difficult to 
 For example, suppose 
a private citizen engages in anti-abortion protests on a college cam-
pus, which causes the school newspaper to write an editorial piece 
questioning this person’s sanity. Under this expanded version of the 
public figure doctrine, the private individual would have to show that 
the editorial writer acted with actual malice, instead of the traditional-
ly lower standard for defamation because the protestor voluntarily 
injected himself into the discussion of a public issue. 
  
 4 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-83 (1964) (accepting, 
for the first time, a different standard for plaintiffs who have assumed the role as a 
public official in a defamation action). 
 5 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) (stating that 
“[t]hose who, by reason of notoriety of their achievements or vigor and success with 
which they seek the public’s attention, are properly classed as public figures….”). 
 6 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80. 
 7 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344 (“Public officials and public figures usually enjoy 
significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication [than private 
individuals] and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false state-
ments….”). 
 8 See id. at 361-69 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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analyze whether an individual, through his online activity, has volun-
tarily assumed the public spotlight and accompanying criticism such 
that he should be subject to the actual malice standard in a defamation 
suit. The Supreme Court has yet to consider defamation in the Internet 
context, and it is unclear whether it will continue to use the traditional 
public figure doctrine framework, or move towards a theory of First 
Amendment protection that has a greater focus on whether the dis-
puted statements deal with a general or public issue. 
Against this backdrop, the need for a consistent standard for deal-
ing with online defamation suits is necessary to ensure appropriate 
protection of First Amendment interests. Part II of this Note describes 
various forms of online discourse and the typical problems that arise 
in classifying Internet speech as defamatory. Part III considers the 
Constitutional right to anonymous speech, the emergence of John Doe 
Subpoenas and a brief description of the various tests adopted by 
courts to deal with the complexities of this procedural mechanism. 
Part IV examines the traditional public figure doctrine and discusses 
the general or public interest framework. Part V advocates for a shift 
in the classification of public figures, limited-purpose public figures, 
and private individuals in the Internet context. Under the proposed 
Internet public figure doctrine, courts would focus on an expanded 
view of limited-purpose public figures and consider whether the dis-
puted speech relates to an issue of general or public interest before 
compelling the disclosure of the identity of an alleged defamer.  
I. ONLINE DISCOURSE 
The Internet provides a remarkable forum in which individuals are 
able to engage in discussions with other users around the globe from 
the privacy of their own homes and computers. Additionally, the In-
ternet has supplanted the former primacy of many mass media out-
lets—newspapers, magazines and books—with a new a medium of 
mass communication that allows all users with an Internet connection 
to engage in public discourse.9 Under traditional modes of communi-
cation, individuals are often prevented from expressing their opinions 
and ideas because of the ability for the outlet to stand as the gatekee-
per between the speaker and the audience.10
  
 9 See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Anonymity in Cyberspace: What Can We 
Learn From John Doe ?, 50 B.C.L. REV. 1373, 1375 (2009) [hereinafter Lidsky, 
Anonymity in Cyberspace]. 
 10 Id. 
 For example, an individ-
ual might submit a letter to the local newspaper describing his outrage 
regarding some municipal initiative. Within this letter, the citizen may 
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use strong language, criticize public officials and call for some action 
to change the policy. However, this letter may never reach its intended 
audience because the editor may decide not to publish it based on the 
content and language, or simply because there is no room in the issue. 
This example has an entirely different outcome in the Internet context 
because there is virtually no impediment to the citizen’s ability to 
deliver his message. He could take the same letter and post it in a chat 
room or on another online forum without having to first submit the 
content to an editor or publisher. In essence, the citizen acts as his 
own online editor or publisher and is free to choose when, where and 
what ideas to convey to his audience.  
Some commentators argue that the increased ability to reach a 
mass audience results in a democratization of discourse because the 
Internet makes it more difficult “for those in power to control the in-
terpretation of public events.”11 For example, the citizen in the hypo-
thetical above can disseminate his message as often and to as many 
people as he wants by reposting the letter on different websites. Be-
cause free Internet access is available at many locations, the citizen 
does not need money or status to participate in important political 
discourse and debate—a right which is at the core of First Amend-
ment protections12
Obviously not all Internet discourse involves valuable debate of 
public or political issues. Because a speaker can create inflammatory 
posts anonymously, the Internet provides a cloak of secrecy that can 
encourage speech that is not within the traditional bounds of public 
debate and discourse. Online defamation, however, can have real life 
consequences for victims, including damage to reputation, diminished 
 regardless of the medium. Thus, it is important to 
consider this right in the context of online defamation claims because 
with the continuing decline of many traditional mediums, specifically 
newspapers, the opportunity for online public debate is even more 
salient.  
  
 11 Id.; see also Nathaniel Gleicher, Note, John Doe Subpoenas: Toward a 
Consistent Legal Standard, 118 YALE L.J. 320, 323 (2008) (comparing the ability of 
pamphleteer to deliver his message with the access the Internet gives users to reach 
millions of readers with the click of a button). 
 12 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (citing Justice Brandeis’ 
concurrence in Whitney v. California, 275 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) for the proposi-
tion “[t]hose who won our independence believed that public discussion is a political 
duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American govern-
ment….Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion, they 
eschewed silence coerced by law—the argument of force in its worst form. Recogniz-
ing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution 
so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed.”). 
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job prospects, and even serious emotional harm.13 For example, in 
Doe 1 v. Individuals, a Connecticut case involving the website Au-
toAdmit, an Internet user posted harassing, threatening and defamato-
ry remarks about two female Yale law students on a website designed 
to create an anonymous forum for undergraduate and professional 
students.14 The posts contained extremely derogatory remarks about 
the students, including references to sexual relations with family 
members, sexually transmitted diseases, and even advocating for the 
rape of the students.15
The demarcation between speech related to public discourse and 
speech for the purposes of degradation and harassment is not always 
as clear as it was in the AutoAdmit case. As illustrated in the introduc-
tion, the anonymity of the Internet is often the catalyst that causes 
some speakers to engage in valuable discourse that he or she may not 
have otherwise participated in. Because the line between valuable and 
slanderous speech is not always clear, courts should be leery of per-
mitting a broad recovery for defamation. To ensure Constitutional 
protection, courts should move away from the traditional approach in 
relying on the public figure doctrine because it does not adequately 
address the complex issues arising from online anonymous speech.
 While other areas of the AutoAdmit website 
clearly fall within the ambit of valuable public discourse—for exam-
ple, providing opinions and evaluations of educational institutions—
the derogatory, threatening and slanderous statements regarding these 
individuals fall outside the category of high value First Amendment 
speech.  
16
Consider the following hypothetical based on the AutoAdmit 
case: what if the Yale Law students made a post on AutoAdmit ar-
guing that Yale should eliminate the ROTC program on campus be-
cause of the “Don’t ask, Don’t tell” policy regarding gay and lesbian 
military service. And instead of making threats of violence, the de-
faming user referred to the students as closeted lesbians. On one hand, 
the statement could be considered slander because it is untrue and 
could possibly do harm to the students’ reputation or job prospects. 
On the other hand, the students voluntarily injected themselves into an 
important public issue—gay and lesbian rights—by posting on the 
  
  
 13 Jason C. Miller, Who’s Exposing John Doe? Distinguishing Between Pub-
lic and Private Figure Plaintiffs in Subpoenas to ISPS in Anonymous Online Defama-
tion Suits, 13 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 229, 231 (2008).  
 14 Doe I v. Individuals (AutoAdmit.com), 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 251 (D. 
Conn. 2008). The Yale law students eventually accepted an undisclosed settlement 
from the defendant who was subsequently identified. 
 15 Id.  
 16 See discussion infra Section V. 
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website and the user’s comments are related to important political 
discourse.  
This Note highlights the unique problems arising from the in-
crease in online discourse and advocates a shift away from the tradi-
tional public figure doctrine to focus on whether the plaintiff volunta-
rily assumed a role in a public issue.  
II. RIGHT TO ANONYMOUS SPEECH AND JOHN DOE 
SUBPOENAS 
A. Anonymous Speech 
The Supreme Court has recognized the right to speak anonymous-
ly as a constitutionally protected right.17 In McIntyre v. Ohio, Margret 
McIntyre distributed handbills opposing a school tax referendum at a 
local meeting. Instead of signing her own name to the handbills, she 
chose to sign in the name of “CONCERNED PARENTS AND TAX 
PAYERS.”18 In response, the Ohio Elections Committee fined McIn-
tyre $100 for violating an Ohio elections law that prohibited the dis-
tribution of election materials “unless there appear[ed] on such form 
of publication…the name and residence” of the person responsible for 
the material.19 In considering the constitutionality of this restriction, 
the Supreme Court held that “an author’s decision to remain anonym-
ous, like other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the con-
tent of a publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected 
by the First Amendment.”20
The McIntyre holding is predicated on two grounds: utilitarian 
considerations and individual autonomy.
  
21 First, the Court considered 
the importance of anonymous speech to political discourse and litera-
ture noting that “the interest in having anonymous works enter the 
marketplace of ideas unquestionably outweighs any public interest in 
requiring disclosure as a condition of entry.”22 In support of the mar-
ketplace of ideas rationale for First Amendment protection,23
  
 17 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995). 
 18 Id. at 337. 
 19 Id. at 338 n.3 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §3599.09(A) (1988)). 
 20 Id. at 342. 
 21 Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 1, at 1542-43. 
 22 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342. 
 the 
 23 The search for truth or “marketplace of ideas” rationale for the protection 
of free speech or free expression rests on the idea that “when men have realized that 
time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they 
believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is 
better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the 
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the 
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Court concluded, “[a]nonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the 
majority,”24 which protects a full and robust public discourse by pro-
moting the discussion of both popular and unpopular opinions. Thus, 
the Court saw the protection of anonymous speech as a necessary sa-
feguard to foster the contributions of valuable information to the mar-
ketplace of ideas.25 Because protecting anonymity allows an author to 
disseminate a variety of ideas without fear of repercussions, the public 
as a whole benefits by the increased availability of diverse informa-
tion in the marketplace.26
The second ground for the McIntyre decision concerned an au-
thor’s autonomous right to speak anonymously.
 
27 The Court noted 
that “an author is generally free to decide whether or not to disclose 
his or her true identity”28 and identification requirements, like the 
Ohio elections law, automatically destroy this personal choice. Re-
quiring identity disclosure discourages authors from engaging in po-
tentially controversial speech because it requires the author to reveal 
“the content of [his or her] thoughts on a controversial issue.”29
McIntyre concerned the right to anonymous speech involving po-
litical debate and discourse through distribution of unsigned handbills. 
And while the Supreme Court has not yet considered the issue of ano-
nymous speech on the Internet directly, it has recognized that tradi-
tional concepts of First Amendment protection apply equally on the 
Internet.
 Thus, 
recognizing that the First Amendment protects authorial autonomy 
allows an individual to choose whether or not to assume ownership 
over unpopular ideas, which promotes the underlying free speech right 
to engage in public discourse. 
30
  
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.” Abrams v. United 
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 24 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357. 
 25 Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 1, at 1542. 
 26 For example, authorial anonymity allowed James Madison, Alexander 
Hamilton and John Jay to publish the Federalist Papers without fear of repercussion 
from the British Crown. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 343 n.6. 
 27 Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 1, at 1543. 
 28 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 341. 
 29 Id. at 355; see also Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 1, at 1543. 
 30 See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868, 870-71 (1997) (The Supreme 
Court applied traditional First Amendment principles to invalidate two sections of the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996 that were designed to protect minors from 
“indecent” and “patently offensive” communications over the Internet.); see also 
Gleicher, supra note 11, at 326. 
 For instance, in Reno v. ACLU the Court noted there was 
“no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that 
should be applied to [the Internet],” because the Internet is a “dynam-
ic, multifaceted category of communication [that] in-
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cludes…traditional print and news services…audio, video, and still 
images, as well as interactive, real-time dialogue.”31 The Court ex-
pressly recognized the importance of speech on the Internet, noting 
that “[t]hrough the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line 
can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it 
could from any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, mail explod-
ers, and newsgroups, the same individual can become a pamphle-
teer.”32
Because the Supreme Court has recognized a Constitutional right 
to anonymous speech and has indicated that First Amendment protec-
tions extend to the Internet, it follows that the First Amendment also 
likely protects the right to anonymous speech on the Internet. Howev-
er, while the right to anonymous speech is vast, it is not without limi-
tation. One such limitation arises when the right to speak anonymous-
ly conflicts with an individual’s right to recover for defamation.
  
33 In 
the context of online defamation suits, courts have struggled with 
striking a balance that adequately protects the speaker’s right to ano-
nymity and the individual’s right to recover for reputational injury.34
Because of the vast accessibility of the Internet and the incalcula-
ble amount of users, many plaintiffs seeking redress for online defa-
mation are often unable to identify an anonymous poster. It is com-
mon for a plaintiff to move for a discovery subpoena against the In-
ternet Service Provider (ISP), on which the allegedly defamatory ma-
terial was posted, in order to uncover the identity of the defamer.
 
The manifestation of these competing interests arises when a court 
must consider whether to compel the disclosure of the identity of an 
alleged online defamer through the procedural mechanism referred to 
as the John Doe Subpoena. 
B. John Doe Subpoena 
35
  
 31 Reno, 521 U.S. at 870. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 1 at 1595 (“Some courts have simply found 
the anonymous speaker’s rights unworthy of protection once the plaintiff has alleged 
the speech is tortious.”). 
 34 See id. at n. 256 (noting various cases that have attempted to strike a bal-
ance between the plaintiff’s and defendant’s rights in a claim for online defamation). 
 35 Ashley I. Kissinger & Katharine Larsen, Shielding Jane and John: Can the 
Media Protect Anonymous Online Speech?, COMM. LAW., July 2009, at 4 [hereinafter 
Kissinger & Larsen, Shielding Jane and John]. 
 
The initial subpoena may only reveal the Internet Protocol (IP) ad-
dress linked to a particular site, and plaintiffs may have to file a sec-
ondary subpoena seeking the contact information associated with the 
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computer using the identified IP address.36 These procedural mechan-
isms are virtually the only tools available for plaintiffs to identify their 
alleged defamer. Thus, the standards used by courts in considering 
whether to compel identification have serious implications for the 
defendant’s right to speak anonymously.37 Beyond tort recovery, 
some commentators have expressed concern that plaintiffs often have 
extra-judicial motivations for using a John Doe Subpoena. They note 
that plaintiffs may use the subpoenas to “unmask[ ] defendants who 
have said nothing actionable [in order to] ‘simply seek revenge or 
retribution.’”38
The Supreme Court and the federal Courts of Appeals have yet to 
adopt a uniform approach for balancing the plaintiff’s right of reputa-
tional redress and the defendant’s right to anonymous speech.
 However, without John Doe Subpoenas some plaintiffs 
would never be able to identify their defamer despite having a colora-
ble defamation claim. In struggling with this tension, courts approach 
the merits of John Doe Subpoenas in varying ways, resulting in a lita-
ny of different tests across jurisdictions.  
C. Different Tests 
39 In-
stead, the lower courts have experimented with a variety of standards 
to determine whether a plaintiff has met his or her burden, and thus is 
entitled to uncover the identity of the alleged defamer.40
  
 36 Gleicher, supra note 11, at 328 (“Only the ISP knows what IP address was 
attached to which computer at any given time. Thus, the plaintiff must file another 
subpoena targeting the poster’s ISP, seeking the address, telephone number, and other 
contact information....”). 
 37 Id. (“Because John Doe subpoenas are the central tool for litigation in this 
area, the standard that governs them effectively determines the breadth of the right to 
anonymous speech on the Internet.”); see also Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 1, at 1595 
(“If all it takes is an allegation of defamation to uncover a defendant’s identity, the 
right to speak anonymously is very fragile indeed, because it is easy for a plaintiff to 
allege defamation any time he comes in for harsh criticism online.”). 
 38 Gleicher, supra note 11, at 328-29 (quoting Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 
451, 457 (Del. 2005)); see also Lidsky, Anonymity in Cyberspace, supra note 9, at 
1377 (noting that these tests “are designed to sort legitimate defamation actions from 
‘cyberslapps’—unfounded suits designed only to chill speech—at an early stage of 
the discovery process”). 
 39 Kissinger & Larsen, Shielding Jane and John, supra note 35 at 5. 
 40 Id. (“The critical element in each of the tests articulated by the courts is the 
degree of burden imposed on the plaintiff to demonstrate the viability of his or her 
case before the anonymous poster will be unmasked.”). 
 These stan-
dards can be divided into roughly three categories reflecting the evi-
dentiary burden the court requires of a plaintiff in seeking a John Doe 
Subpoena: good faith, motion to dismiss, and prima facie/summary 
judgment.  
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1. Good Faith Showing 
The “good faith basis” standard developed in In re Subpoena 
Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc.41 is the least speech protective 
standard and remains the minority approach.42 America Online (AOL) 
sought to quash a subpoena from a company seeking the identities of 
five alleged defamers who made posts in an Internet chat room, which 
AOL vigorously defended on First Amendment grounds.43 In review-
ing the subpoena, the court considered three factors: (1) whether the 
court is satisfied with the strength of the evidence presented, (2) 
whether the party requesting the subpoena had a “good faith basis” to 
believe the claim was actionable, and (3) whether the defendant’s 
identity is necessary to proceed with the claim.44
To illustrate the good faith standard, consider the following ex-
ample: a school teacher is not given tenure because there are online 
allegations that her nontraditional teaching style is the result of her 
abuse of illegal drugs. The comments are posted on a popular blog for 
students and faculty. The teacher attempted to respond to the blog 
posts by denying the accusations, but the anonymous user continues to 
post comments under the screen name Xtacy45. In order to vindicate 
her name and reputation, she seeks a John Doe Subpoena to compel 
the name of her alleged defamer. Under the good faith standard, the 
court would determine whether the teacher has a good faith belief that 
her claim is actionable, which seems easily met by her failure to get 
tenure and her willingness to pursue her alleged defamer (an actual 
drug abuser would arguably not go this far). Further, it is hard to im-
agine a scenario in which the identity of the alleged defamer would be 
unnecessary for the lawsuit to proceed because without this informa-
tion it would be very difficult to serve process and disprove the con-
  
  
 41 In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc. (In re AOL), No. 40570, 
2000 WL 1210372, at *8 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 2000), rev’d on other grounds sub 
nom. Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 
2001). 
 42 See Gleicher, supra note 11 at 350-51 (“A good faith standard provides 
little if any protection for defendants. Because the unmasking of a defendant’s identi-
ty can cause significant harm and deter other anonymous speakers from entering 
public debate, defendants deserve more than merely symbolic protection.); see also 
Kissinger & Larsen, Shielding Jane and John, supra note 35 at 8 (describing how the 
good faith test “has been largely distinguished or rejected by courts addressing claims 
involving expressive speech”). 
 43 In re AOL, 2000 WL 1210372, at *2 (“AOL contends that the subpoena 
duces tecum…unreasonably impairs the First Amendment right of the John Does to 
speak anonymously on the Internet….”). 
 44 Id. at *8. 
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tent of the statements.45 Thus, it appears that the teacher could easily 
compel the identity of her alleged defamer. This conclusion causes 
some courts and commentators to reject this approach as not adequate-
ly protective of the right to anonymous speech.46
In Columbia Insurance Co. v. Seescandy.com, decided prior to In 
re AOL, the court required the plaintiff to meet a slightly higher bur-
den before it would uncover the identity of two defendants in an ac-
tion for trademark infringement and dilution.
  
2. Motion to Dismiss 
47 A California Federal 
District Court held that in order to compel disclosure of the defen-
dant’s identity the plaintiff must: (1) sufficiently identify the defen-
dant for jurisdiction purposes, (2) identify any steps taken to locate the 
defendant, (3) demonstrate that the facts alleged could withstand a 
motion to dismiss, and (4) demonstrate that the information sought 
(the defendant’s identity) would be relevant to the claim asserted.48 
The court further explained that under the motion to dismiss standard, 
the pleadings must rise above mere conclusory statements. It required 
the “plaintiff [to] make some showing that an act giving rise to civil 
liability actually occurred and that the discovery is aimed at revealing 
specific identifying features of the person or entity who committed 
that act.”49
In applying this standard to the hypothetical provided above, the 
teacher would have to first demonstrate that her alleged defamer is a 
real person who is subject to suit in the court where she filed the com-
plaint. Because the user specifically responded to her posts with more 
allegedly defamatory comments, it is likely that the user is a real per-
son who is subject to suit in the jurisdiction. Second, the teacher 
would have to identify any good faith attempts to locate the defendant, 
which again is demonstrated by her interaction with the user on the 
blog. Third, the teacher would have to allege sufficient facts to with-
stand a hypothetical motion to dismiss. Thus, she would have to plead 
facts that support a prima facie case entitling her to relief, which the 
  
  
 45 See Jessica L. Chilson, Note, Unmasking John Doe: Setting a Standard for 
Discovery in Anonymous Internet Defamation Cases, 95 VA. L. REV. 389, 410 (2009) 
(highlighting the deficiencies in the good faith test and the relative ease in which 
plaintiffs can satisfy the requirements). 
 46 See, e.g., Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 458 (Del. 2005) (“In our 
view, this ‘good faith’ standard is too easily satisfied to protect sufficiently a defen-
dant’s right to speak anonymously.”); see also Gleicher, supra note 11 at 350-51. 
 47 Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 
 48 Id. at 578-80. 
 49 Id. at 580. 
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court in Seescandy.com predicated on a showing of civil liability and 
discovery targeted at revealing a defendant who is potentially liable.50
A more speech protective approach towards John Doe Subpoenas 
is demonstrated in several cases beginning with Dendrite Internation-
al, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3.
 
The anonymous defendant claimed the teacher was a drug user and 
under this standard, the teacher would need to plead facts establishing 
that she is not a drug user, which if proven would entitle her to relief 
for defamation. She would also have to demonstrate that the subpoena 
would reveal the name of the person responsible for the comments, 
meaning that in all likelihood the ISP provider would be able to pro-
vide contact information for the user. Because a single individual with 
the username Xtacy45 wrote all the comments regarding the teacher’s 
alleged drug use, the court would likely find her subpoena sufficiently 
targeted at revealing the specific defendant. Based on the foregoing, 
the teacher would likely have little difficulty meeting the demands of 
the motion to dismiss test. 
3. Prima Facie Showing / Summary Judgment Standard 
51 In Dendrite, a company sought the identity of 
an anonymous poster who allegedly made defamatory statements 
about their business practices on a Yahoo! bulletin board. Even 
though Seescandy.com did not involve the defendant’s First Amend-
ment rights,52 the Dendrite motion judge found the Seescandy.com 
court’s treatment of the unique aspects of the Internet particularly 
applicable in choosing to adopt the motion to dismiss standard.53 The 
Appellate Division, however, found the motion to dismiss standard to 
be insufficiently protective of First Amendment concerns and held 
that the “application of [the] motion-to-dismiss standard in isolation 
fails to provide a basis for analysis and balancing of Dendrite’s re-
quest for disclosure in light of John Doe No. 3’s competing right of 
anonymity in the exercise of his right of free speech.”54
  
 50 Id.  
 51 Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No.3, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2001). 
 52 See discussion supra part III.B.2. 
 53 See Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 766 (“In light of free speech and defamation 
considerations, as well as the fact that the Internet played a role in this dispute, the 
motion judge relied on the case of Columbia Ins. Co., v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 
573 (N.D. Cal. 1999) to resolve whether he should permit Dendrite to conduct dis-
covery to ascertain John Doe No. 3’s identity.”). 
 54 Id. at 770. 
 Instead, the 
court determined that the plaintiff must demonstrate a prima facie case 
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before it would compel disclosure of the defendant’s identity.55 In 
addition to the prima facie showing, the Dendrite court added two 
additional elements to the analysis: (1) a plaintiff must attempt to noti-
fy the defendant and give the anonymous poster a reasonable time to 
respond,56 and (2) a balancing factor, which requires the court to con-
sider “the defendant’s First Amendment right of anonymous free 
speech against the strength of the prima facie case presented and the 
necessity for the disclosure…to allow the plaintiff to properly pro-
ceed.”57 The Dendrite test is now considered the dominant standard 
among courts in considering John Doe Subpoenas.58
Despite the general acceptance of the Dendrite test, the court in 
Doe No. 1 v. Cahill
 
59 chose to abandon the additional balancing factor 
and instead required the plaintiff to make an evidentiary showing suf-
ficient to survive a hypothetical motion for summary judgment before 
it would compel the name of the anonymous poster.60 In Cahill, a 
town council member and his wife brought a defamation claim against 
four John Doe defendants for posts alleging Cahill’s diminished men-
tal capacity on an Internet blog.61 In rejecting the full Dendrite analy-
sis, the court determined that the summary judgment test itself was 
enough of a balance of defendant’s First Amendment rights and that 
the additional balancing factor was unnecessary.62 In support of the 
Cahill decision, some commentators argue that if a plaintiff is able to 
make an evidentiary showing that a defamation claim is actionable, 
then there is no need to balance the interest of the alleged defamer 
because the scales are tipped in favor of allowing recovery for reputa-
tional injury.63
  
 55 Id. at 760 (“The complaint and all information provided to the court should 
be carefully reviewed to determine whether plaintiff has set forth a prima facie cause 
of action against the fictitiously-named anonymous defendants.”). 
 56 Id. (The court explained that “[t]hese notification efforts should include 
posting a message of notification of the [subpoena] to the anonymous user on the 
ISP’s pertinent message board.”). 
 57 Id. at 760-61. 
 58 Lidsky, Anonymity in Cyberspace, supra note 9, at 1378. 
 59 Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005). 
 60 Id. at 461 (“[The balancing factor] adds no protection above and beyond 
that of the summary judgment test and needlessly complicates the analysis. Accor-
dingly, we adopt a modified Dendrite standard….”). 
 61 Id. at 454. 
 62 Id. at 461. 
 However, some courts and critics view the decision as 
 63 See Lidsky, Anonymity in Cyberspace, supra note 9, at 1380 (“Under the 
prima facie evidence standard, the defendant’s right to speak anonymously outweighs 
the plaintiff’s right to pursue a libel action unless and until the plaintiff presents evi-
dence that the libel claim is viable; once this burden is met, the balance tips in favor 
of allowing plaintiff to pursue a claim for vindication of her reputation. An explicit 
balancing test serves only to tilt the scales further toward the protection of anonymous 
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overemphasizing a procedural mechanism that varies across jurisdic-
tions and thus prevents plaintiffs from being able to predict the re-
quired evidentiary burden for recovery.64
Finally, in Krinsky v. Doe 6, a corporate executive brought a de-
famation claim against ten anonymous defendants who made alleged-
ly defamatory statements on a Yahoo! message board.
 
65 In fashioning 
a standard, the court combined elements of both the Dendrite and Ca-
hill standards. The court determined that requiring a plaintiff to under-
take reasonable steps to notify a defendant, an element present in both 
standards, was not “unduly burdensome.”66 In analyzing plaintiff’s 
evidentiary burden, Krinsky embraced the prima facie showing ele-
ment from Dendrite.67 Similar to the rationale in Cahill, the court fur-
ther noted that if the plaintiff has a factual basis to support an actiona-
ble claim then “balancing of interests should not be necessary to over-
come defendant’s constitutional right to speak anonymously.”68 This 
piecemeal analysis has led some commentators to refer to the Krinsky 
standard as the “Cahill-Dendrite” standard.69
The lack of a uniform standard of review for John Doe Subpoenas 
has produced a broad range of results, which reduces both the plain-
tiff’s and the defendant’s ability to predict whether certain conduct 
will result in the loss of anonymity and be subject to civil liability. 
The disagreement among commentators focuses primarily on what 
type of evidentiary burden is required of a plaintiff before a court will 
compel the disclosure of the identity of an alleged defamer. Further, 
some critics worry that even assuming the courts adopt a uniform evi-
 
4. Critical Response to the Various Tests 
  
speech because presumably it allows even a viable defamation claim to be dismissed 
on the ground that it is not strong enough to outweigh defendant’s First Amendment 
interests.”). 
 64 See, e.g., Krinksy v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 244 (Ct. App. 2008) 
(“We find it unnecessary and potentially confusing to attach a procedural label, 
whether summary judgment or motion to dismiss, to the showing required of a plain-
tiff seeking the identity of an anonymous speaker on the Internet.”); see also Kissin-
ger & Larsen, Shielding Jane and John, supra note 35, at 6. 
 65 Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 235. 
 66 Id. at 244. 
 67 Id. at 245 (“We therefore agree with those courts that have compelled the 
plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of the elements of libel in order to overcome a 
defendant’s motion to quash a subpoena seeking his or her identity.”). 
 68 Id. at 245-46. 
 69 Gleicher, supra note 11, at 342. 
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dentiary burden for plaintiffs, the procedural differences across juris-
dictions will still produce inconsistent results.70
Courts and commentators generally agree that the good faith stan-
dard proposed in AOL does not adequately protect important First 
Amendment rights.
  
71 In AOL, the court did not clearly define what 
constitutes a “good faith” showing, noting that a plaintiff must dem-
onstrate “a legitimate, good faith basis to contend that it may be the 
victim of conduct actionable in the jurisdiction where the suit was 
filed.”72
Commentators also criticize the motion to dismiss standard devel-
oped in Seescandy.com, which requires plaintiff to allege enough facts 
to “establish to the Court’s satisfaction that the plaintiff’s suit against 
defendant could withstand a motion to dismiss.”
 Critics argue the test provides no concrete guideline for 
courts in determining whether or not to compel a defendant’s identity, 
and does not allow for consideration of whether a defendant is exer-
cising a legitimate privilege to speak anonymously about a matter in 
the public discourse. For example, in the teacher hypothetical above, 
the teacher would be able to satisfy this low threshold and reveal her 
alleged defamer, even if her defamation claim is not very strong or if 
she does not actually intend to pursue her claim, as long as she has a 
good faith belief that her claim is actionable. Thus, this standard 
would allow the teacher to expose the user, engage in non-judicial 
retaliation, and even worse, potentially deter other speakers from en-
gaging in important public debate regarding education practices.  
73
  
 70 See, e.g., id. at 351-52 (“Transforming [the motion to dismiss test] into a 
national standard also poses another problem: John Doe Subpoenas arise not only in 
federal court but also in state courts across the country. The showing necessary for a 
plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss varies from state to state.”). 
 71 See Krinsky, 72 Cal.Rptr, 3d at 241 (“[The good faith standard] offers no 
practical, reliable way to determine the plaintiff’s good faith and leaves the speaker 
with little protection.”); Doe v. Cahill, 844 A.2d 451, 458 (Del. 2005) (rejecting the 
lower court’s reliance on the AOL “good faith” test because it did not adequately 
protect a defendant’s right to speak anonymously); see also Gleicher, supra note 11, 
at 350-51 (describing the risk that a low threshold for plaintiffs leads to “mere[] sym-
bolic protection” for defendants); Kissinger & Larsen, Shielding Jane and John, su-
pra note 35, at 7 (noting that the “good faith” standard “provides no special protection 
for anonymous speech” and is akin to expedited discovery under the Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 26(d)) (footnote omitted). 
 72 In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc. (In re AOL), No. 40570, 
2000 WL 1210372, at *8 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 2000), rev’d on other grounds sub 
nom. Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 
2001). 
 73 Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 579 (N.D. Cal. 
1999). 
 The court further 
clarified that the motion to dismiss standard required more than mere 
conclusory pleadings and was “akin to the process used during crimi-
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nal investigations to obtain warrants” (i.e., requiring probable 
cause).74 Despite placing a seemingly higher burden on plaintiffs, 
commentators argue that this threshold puts a defendant’s First 
Amendment rights in the hands of a procedural mechanism that is not 
settled at the federal level or consistent across the states.75 Thus, a 
plaintiff may be subject to a different evidentiary threshold depending 
on whether he or she decided to file in state court or in federal court. 
This inconsistency may create a perverse incentive for the plaintiff to 
file in a state jurisdiction where there is the lower motion to dismiss 
standard and could lead to forum shopping.76
Similarly, the motion for summary judgment test is also grounded 
in a procedural mechanism that requires a plaintiff to make a different 
evidentiary showing depending on the specific jurisdiction where the 
claim is filed. In Krinksy, the court specifically addressed this criti-
cism noting, “[w]e find it unnecessary and potentially confusing to 
attach a procedural label, whether summary judgment or motion to 
dismiss, to the showing required of a plaintiff seeking the identity of 
an anonymous speaker on the Internet.”
 Because there is va-
riance across the jurisdictions on what a plaintiff must allege in order 
to compel the disclosure of the identity of an alleged defamer, and 
there is an incentive to file in a lenient jurisdiction, the motion to dis-
miss standard inadequately protects the defendant’s interest in ano-
nymity and is an undesirable basis for a uniform standard. 
77 The court further clarified 
the difficulty of assigning a procedural label, stating that defamation 
cases “may relate to actions filed in other jurisdictions, which may 
have different standards governing pleadings and motions; conse-
quently, it could generate more confusion to define an obligation by 
referring to a particular motion procedure.”78
  
 74 Id. 
 75 See Gleicher, supra note 11, at 352 (“Relying on a motion to dismiss label 
to evaluate John Doe subpoenas would create an inconsistent, uncertain standard that 
varied not based on jurisdictions’ rulings or the plaintiffs’ substantive claims, but on 
procedural standards that were never intended to govern anonymous speech.”); Ash-
ley I. Kissinger & Katharine Larsen, Untangling the Legal Labyrinth: Protections For 
Anonymous Online Speech, 13 No. 9 J. INTERNET L. 1, 20 (2010) (describing variation 
among states in applying the motion to dismiss standard to John Doe Subpoenas) 
[hereinafter Kissinger & Larsen, Untangling the Legal Labyrinth]; see generally Suja 
A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under 
Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15 (2010) (discussing the unsettled 
state of the motion to dismiss standard after the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal). 
 76 See Gleicher, supra note 11, at 352. 
 77 Krinksy v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 244 (Ct. App. 2008). 
 78 Id. 
 Although the summary 
judgment standard sets a higher burden than the motion to dismiss 
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standard, and is thus arguably more speech protective, this threshold is 
inappropriate because the evidentiary burden required under a sum-
mary judgment motion still depends on the civil procedure rules of the 
particular state, and thus cannot provide a sound basis for a uniform 
standard.  
After the decisions in Dendrite and Cahill, there appears to be an 
emerging consensus among courts and commentators that requiring a 
plaintiff to make a prima facie showing that the underlying claim is 
actionable is the preferable standard for reviewing John Doe Subpoe-
nas in online defamation suits.79 At least one commentator notes that 
while there is still variation in both the substantive law and eviden-
tiary burden across jurisdictions, the variation does not raise the same 
issues as the motion to dismiss or summary judgment standards be-
cause the definition of a “prima facie showing” does not vary; instead, 
it is the specific elements that a plaintiff must satisfy that vary.80 For 
example, a prima facie showing means the same thing in different 
states even though the specific elements of defamation may be differ-
ent.81
Despite a burgeoning general acceptance of the prima facie for-
mulation, there is still considerable disagreement about whether courts 
should engage in a final balancing of a defendant’s First Amendment 
rights against the strength of the plaintiff’s case.
 Thus, the prima facie showing is a more desirable standard be-
cause it provides a certain level of uniformity while allowing for va-
riances in substantive state law.  
82
  
 79 See, e.g., Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 456 (Md. 
2009) (adopting Dendrite and requiring the plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of 
defamation); Krinsky, 72 Cal.Rptr.3d at 244-45 (adopting a prima facie showing 
standard for reviewing John Doe Subpoenas); see also Kissinger & Larsen, Shielding 
Jane and John, supra note 35, at 5-6 (describing the shift from the summary judgment 
formulation of Cahill towards the prima facie standard described in Dendrite); Lidsky, 
Anonymity in Cyberspace, supra note 9, at 1378 (noting that the prima facie case is 
becoming the dominant standard). 
 80 See Gleicher, supra note 11, at 354. 
 81 Id. (“For example, a prima facie claim of libel in Florida requires that the 
plaintiff show that ‘the defendant published a false statement about the plaintiff to a 
third party and that the false statement caused injury to the plaintiff.’ By contrast, in 
Delaware, proving libel requires the plaintiff to show that ‘1) the defendant made a 
defamatory statement; 2) concerning the plaintiff; 3) the statement was pub-
lished;…4) a third party would understand the character of the communication as 
defamatory[; and] 5) the statement is false.’ The meaning of prima facie showing 
[however] does not differ among the jurisdictions….”) (citations omitted). 
 Some commenta-
 82 Compare Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 775 A. 2d 756, 760-61 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (“[A]ssuming the court concludes that the plaintiff has 
presented a prima facie cause of action, the court must balance the defendant’s First 
Amendment right of anonymous free speech against the strength of the prima facie 
case presented and the necessity for the disclosure of the anonymous defendant’s 
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tors argue that the balancing approach is necessary because it allows 
the court to consider the broader consequences of the subpoena, such 
as retaliation against a defendant if his identity is revealed.83 Once 
plaintiff has met her prima facie burden, it is not entirely clear what 
types of potential consequences would require the court to intervene 
and protect a defendant’s identity. However, it seems clear that threats 
of severe bodily harm or death would certainly qualify.84 Critics of 
this approach argue that the balancing test is counterproductive to the 
goals of predictability and protection of First Amendment rights be-
cause it would provide judges with discretion to decide whether or not 
to reveal defendant’s identity despite plaintiff’s apparently viable 
claim.85
Because the main focus of this Note is a formulation of an Inter-




identity to allow the plaintiff to properly proceed.”), and Moblisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 
P.3d 712, 720 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (rejecting Cahill’s elimination of the balancing 
step stating, “[i]n our view, requiring the court to balance the parties’ competing 
interests is necessary to achieve appropriate rulings in the vast array of factually dis-
tinct cases likely to involve anonymous speech”), with Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 
451, 461 (Del. 2005) (holding that portions of the Dendrite balancing test were unne-
cessary because it “adds no protection above and beyond that of the summary judg-
ment test and needlessly complicated the analysis”). 
 83 See Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 1, at 1601-02 (“If a plaintiff is able to 
overcome the defendant’s privilege to speak anonymously, the defendant should have 
a final opportunity to convince the judge, in camera, that the magnitude of harm she 
faces if her identity is revealed outweighs the plaintiff’s need for her identi-
ty….Although a defendant would rarely be able to establish a threat of sufficient 
magnitude to outweigh plaintiff’s need for defendant’s identity, this last component of 
the privilege analysis serves as a final piece of insurance that defendant’s right to 
speak anonymously is not too lightly compromised.”); see also Gleicher, supra note 
11, at 361 (describing the flexibility the balancing factor gives courts to consider the 
effects of the subpoena on the defendant). 
 84 See Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 1, at 1601; Gleicher, supra note 11, at 
361. 
 85 Michael S. Vogel, Unmasking “John Doe” Defendants: The Case Against 
Excessive Hand-Wringing over Legal Standards, 83 OR. L. REV. 795, 808 (2004) 
(criticizing the fact “that, even if plaintiff has alleged a viable legal claim against the 
defendant—and supported that claim with admissible evidence—the court may still 
exercise discretion to stop the case in its tracks, at least to the extent that the ‘strength 
of the prima facie case’ is given less weight than ‘the defendant’s First Amendment 
right of anonymous free speech.’”) (citation omitted). 
 86 Under the Internet public figure doctrine, certain plaintiff’s would have to 
make a prima facie showing to establish “actual malice” in their defamation claims, 
which would arguably eliminate the need for a final balancing except in the limited 
situations described above. See discussion infra Section V. 
 it is not entirely necessary to resolve 
whether courts should consider a final balancing element. On one 
hand, the balancing test could resolve important issues, such as the 
harmful effects on the defendant if his identity is revealed and the 
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importance of the type of speech at issue. On the other hand, adopting 
a balancing element is counterproductive to creating a uniform system 
where both plaintiffs and defendants can predict whether certain con-
duct will result in liability because the ultimate decision is subject to 
judicial discretion. At the very least, the court should be permitted to 
conduct an in camera review of the plaintiff’s motion in considering 
the potential consequences of revelation for the defendant and the 
nature of the speech at issue. The in camera review would reduce the 
harmful effects of revealing the defendant’s identity in open court. 
Further, like other discretionary standards, this process would be sub-
ject to review under an abuse of discretion standard. While this pro-
posal does not completely eliminate the unpredictability associated 
with the review of John Doe Subpoenas, courts should only intervene 
in cases where there is a demonstrable need. 
III. DEFAMATORY SPEECH AND THE PUBLIC 
FIGURE DOCTRINE 
Plaintiffs use John Doe Subpoenas as a procedural mechanism to 
uncover the identity of defendants in a variety of legal contexts, in-
cluding, defamation, trademark infringement and trespass to chat-
tels.87 However, this Note focuses solely on the unique problems aris-
ing in Internet defamation claims. In all defamation claims, how the 
plaintiff is classified under the public figure doctrine is a critical de-
termination. This is especially important in the context of John Doe 
Subpoenas for online defamation because when deciding whether or 
not to compel the identity of an anonymous defendant, courts rely on 
the strength of the plaintiff’s factual allegations. If the plaintiff is clas-
sified as a public figure, then the plaintiff must meet a heightened 
pleading standard, alleging that the defendant acted with actual ma-
lice.88
Generally, in order to demonstrate liability for defamation, a pri-
vate plaintiff must establish some variation of the following elements: 
(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (b) an unpri-
vileged publication to a third party; (c) fault amounting at least to neg-
ligence on the part of the publisher; and (d) either actionability of the 
statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm 




 87 Gleicher, supra note 11, at 331 (footnote omitted). 
 88 See discussion infra Section IV.A. 
 89 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §558 (1977 & Supp. 2010). 
 However, the First Amendment requires 
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more of a plaintiff to establish a viable claim for defamation if the 
plaintiff is considered a public figure.90
In a groundbreaking decision, the Supreme Court in New York 
Times v. Sullivan determined for the first time that, in order to protect 
critical aspects of First Amendment freedom, certain categories of 
plaintiffs should be subject to a higher standard to recover for defama-
tion.
  
A. The Public Figure Doctrine 
91 Under this heightened standard, a plaintiff who is considered a 
public official must establish that “the statement was made with ‘ac-
tual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was false or not.”92 In support of this conclu-
sion, the Court noted, “we consider this case against the background 
of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on 
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it 
may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly 
sharp attacks on government and public officials.”93 Although the 
decision in New York Times v. Sullivan did not explain the outer 
boundary of the public official category, the Court subsequently stated 
that, at the very least, it includes “those among the hierarchy of gov-
ernment employees who have, or appear to the public to have, sub-
stantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental 
affairs.”94
In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, the Supreme Court expanded 
the New York Times v. Sullivan holding beyond public officials to 
include allegedly defamatory statements made with regard to public 
figures.
 
95 In so holding, the Court noted that the logical foundation for 
a heightened standard for public officials was also relevant for indi-
viduals whose activities or involvement thrust them into a public con-
troversy.96
  
 90 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-81 (1964). 
 91 Id. at 279-80. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at 270. 
 94 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1965); see also W. Wat Hopkins, The 
Involuntary Public Figure: Not So Dead After All, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 2 
(2003). 
 95 Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (“We consider and 
would hold that a ‘public figure’ who is not a public official may also recover damag-
es for a defamatory falsehood whose substance makes substantial danger to reputation 
apparent, on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme depar-
ture from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by respon-
sible publishers.”). 
 96 Id. 
 Thus, the Court created an additional category of plaintiffs 
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who must allege “actual malice” in a defamation suit—public figures. 
Some commentators have argued that this expansion is broad enough 
to cover celebrities, political leaders and corporations,97
In an attempt to clarify the boundaries of the public figure doc-
trine, the Supreme Court, in Gertz v. Welch, described distinctive cha-
racteristics relating to the classification of public figures. It noted as 
relevant the voluntariness of plaintiff’s status as a public figure
 however, the 
Supreme Court has not explicitly endorsed these specific categories of 
public figures.  
98 and 
plaintiff’s level of “access to the channels of effective communica-
tion” that can be used to combat the reputational impact of negative 
statements.99
Further, in Gertz the Court also identified a category of plaintiffs 
that it classified as limited-purpose public figures. These plaintiffs 
“have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controver-
sies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved.”
 Thus, under the Curtis and Gertz framework, a person 
may be considered an all-purpose public figure if they have voluntari-
ly assumed a position in the public spotlight and acquired adequate 
status or power to combat the harms resulting from negative criticism. 
For example, athletes like Tiger Woods or entertainers like Conan 
O’Brien would likely qualify as all-purpose public figures. They both 
have voluntarily entered the public arena and acquired the requisite 
status and power to secure access to modes of popular media to com-
bat negative speech. 
100 
Subsequently, in Time v. Firestone, the Court noted that “public con-
troversy” was not simply defined as matters that create a “public in-
terest.”101
  
 97 Gleicher, supra note 11, at 332. 
 98 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (“[It is assumed 
that] public officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to in-
creased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood concerning them. No such assump-
tion is justified with respect to a private individual.”). 
 99 Id. at 344 (“Public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly 
greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence have a more 
realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals normally 
enjoy.”) (citations omitted). 
 100 Id. at 345. 
 101 Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976) (“Dissolution of a mar-
riage through judicial proceedings is not the sort of ‘public controversy’ referred to in 
Gertz, even though the marital difficulties of extremely wealthy individuals may be of 
interest to some portion of the reading public.”). Firestone involved the public di-
vorce of members of a prominent United States industrial family, which was sensa-
tionalized by the media, including allegations of extramarital adventures by both 
parties. 
 Thus, if a plaintiff voluntary inserts himself into the public 
controversy regarding a specific issue, then he will have to allege “ac-
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tual malice,” under New York Times v. Sullivan, for any defamation 
claims that arise in connection with that issue. However, the plaintiff 
will not have to meet the heightened burden for claims relating to oth-
er areas of his life because he remains a private individual with re-
spect to those issues.102 For example, American Airlines pilot, Ches-
ley “Sully” Sullenberger, who landed a jet on the Hudson River in 
Manhattan,103
Finally, in Gertz, the Court indicated that there might be rare cir-
cumstances when a plaintiff could be classified as an involuntary pub-
lic figure,
 would likely be considered a limited-purpose public 
figure because he injected himself into the public spotlight regarding 
the specific issue by conducting interviews and selling the rights to his 
story. Therefore, if someone alleged that the real cause of the emer-
gency landing was Sully’s old age and incompetence, then Sully 
would have to allege actual malice in order to recover for defamation. 
However, if someone alleged that he was a child molester because he 
liked to volunteer his time at a local elementary school, then Sully 
would only have to meet the evidentiary burden required by state law 
because the defamatory remarks related to an aspect of his life that is 
beyond the scope of his status as a limited-purpose public figure. 
104 occurring in situations where a person is forced into the 
public debate without voluntarily assuming this status. Consider the 
following example: if a person is caught doing something on a cell 
phone camera, and that video is subsequently posted on the Internet, 
then a private person may be thrust into the public spotlight without 
any voluntary action.105
  
 102 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349 (attempting to reconcile the notion of a limited-
purpose public figure with the state’s right to provide plaintiff recovery for actual 
injury in a defamation claim and noting that “[i]t is therefore appropriate to require 
that state remedies for defamatory falsehood reach no farther than is necessary to 
protect the legitimate interest involved”). 
 103 See Michael Wilson, Flight 1549 Pilot Tells of Terror and Intense Focus, 
N.Y. TIMES, February 8, 2009, at A19. 
 104 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 (“Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to 
become a public figure through no purposeful action of his own, but the instances of 
truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare.”). 
 105 With the increase in mobile technologies, examples of this kind of invo-
luntary public figure are numerous, including: the “Star Wars Kid,” who was trans-
formed into an Internet celebrity after his classmates took a copy of a video, during 
which he was performing Jedi moves, and posted it on the Internet without his per-
mission; and the video of the South Korean woman who was videotaped refusing to 
pick up after her dog, after which she was referred to as “Poop Girl” and subjected to 
media scrutiny. See Nancy S. Kim, Web Site Proprietorship and Online Harassment, 
2009 UTAH L. REV. 993, 1025 (2009) (describing the notoriety and torment regarding 
the “Star Wars Kid”); Paul M. Schwartz, From Victorian Secrets to Cyberspace 
Shaming, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1407, 1429 (2009) (discussing the media attention sur-
rounding the “Poop Girl” video). 
 However, because of the brevity in which the 
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Court discusses the concept of an involuntary public figure—it only 
devoted one sentence—there is debate over whether Gertz only 
created two types of public figures: (1) all-purpose and (2) limited-
purpose, or whether it included a third category of involuntary public 
figures.106 Further, while the Court identified that there may be rare 
instances in which a plaintiff is truly an involuntary public figure, the 
majority expressly rejected the notion that involuntary public figures 
should be subject to a higher burden if the speech involves a public 
issue.107
The Gertz opinion left many unanswered questions regarding the 
state of the involuntary public figure concept; however, despite the 
brevity of its discussion, after Gertz the Supreme Court decided three 
libel cases that at least considered the prospect of applying the invo-




 106 See generally Hopkins, supra note 94, at 10-18. 
 107 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346 (The Supreme Court rejected the idea proposed by 
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia to expand the New York Times v. Sullivan test to include 
issues of general or public interest. The Court noted that such a conception would 
“forc[e] state and federal courts to decide on an ad hoc basis which publications ad-
dress issues of ‘general or public interest’ and which do not—to determine, in the 
words of Mr. Justice Marshall, ‘what information is relevant to self-government.’”) 
(citing Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 79 (1971) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting)). 
 108 See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979) (Hutchinson sued 
for defamation after receiving an award for wasteful government spending. Despite 
substantial press regarding the award, the Court refused to classify the plaintiff as an 
involuntary public figure. The Court noted, “Hutchinson did not thrust himself or his 
views into public controversy to influence others. Respondents have not identified 
such a particular controversy; at most, they point to concern about general public 
expenditures. But that concern…is not sufficient to make Hutchinson a public fig-
ure.”); Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979) (Petitioner was 
accused of espionage and subjected to intense media scrutiny after failing to appear in 
front of the grand jury. Despite this notoriety, the Court refused to classify him as a 
limited purpose public figure because he lacked the requisite voluntariness. Similarly, 
the Court rejected suggestions that it classify petitioner as an involuntary public fig-
ure, noting that “[a] private individual is not automatically transformed into a public 
figure just by becoming involved in or associated with a matter that attracts public 
attention. To accept such reasoning would in effect re-establish the doctrine advanced 
by the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc….”); Time, Inc. v. Fire-
stone, 424 U.S. 448, 457 (1976) (finding that, despite the notoriety surrounding a 
divorce between members of the prominent Firestone family, Mary Alice Firestone 
should not be required to allege “actual malice,” even though she seemingly qualified 
as an involuntary public figure). 
 Ultimately, 
the Court refused to find that the plaintiffs qualified as involuntary 
public figures, thus leaving unclear the question of when an individual 
would qualify under this category. The ambiguity expressed in Gertz 
and the subsequent reluctance by the Court to apply the concept in 
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practice has sparked considerable debate among lower courts and 
scholars over whether the involuntary public figure doctrine is a ne-
cessary classification to protect important First Amendment freedoms, 
or whether it should be abandoned completely.109
Because this Note does not focus on whether courts should aban-
don the involuntary public figure doctrine, it is not necessary to decide 
that complicated issue. Even assuming that courts were to retain the 
concept—arguably there are more instances of involuntary notoriety 
than there were when the Court decided Gertz
  
B. Public Interest in the Public Figure Framework 
110
The Supreme Court first addressed the possibility of requiring a 
plaintiff to assert actual malice if the allegedly defamatory speech 
related to a general or public issue in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 
Inc.
—the more salient 
issue for dealing with claims of online defamation is whether the 
plaintiff is involved with an issue that can be considered of general or 
public interest.  
111 In Rosenbloom, the Philadelphia police arrested the petitioner 
for distributing nudist magazines in violation of the city’s obscenity 
ordinances. The arresting officer called a local radio station with de-
tails of the incident, causing the station to broadcast stories about the 
arrest under titles such as “City Cracks Down on Smut Merchants.”112
If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot 
suddenly become less so merely because a private individual 
 
The distributor sued the radio station and individual police officers for 
defamation. The distributor did not qualify as a public official or a 
public figure under the public figure framework at the time. Thus, the 
Court had to determine whether or not to expand the New York Times 
v. Sullivan standard to include private individuals who allege defama-
tion with regard to matter of public concern. In support of such an 
expansion, the plurality noted that:  
  
 109 See, e.g., Anaya v. CBS Broad. Inc., 626 F.Supp.2d 1158, 1207-11 
(D.N.M. 2009) (discussing the judicial and scholarly opinion regarding the involunta-
ry public figure doctrine); Schultz v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 468 F. Supp. 551, 559 
(E.D. Mich. 1979) (“The continued vitality of this classification is called into serious 
question by the opinion in Firestone.”); but see, e.g., Hopkins, supra note 94, at 45-46 
(arguing that the involuntary public figure doctrine is necessary to protect the press 
and reflects the state of modern society where all individuals are “public” to some 
degree). 
 110 See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 111 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), abrogated by Gertz 
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
 112 Id. at 32-34. 
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is involved, or because in some sense the individual did not 
‘voluntarily’ choose to become involved….[T]he public focus 
is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect, and 
significance of the conduct, not the participant’s prior ano-
nymity or notoriety.113
While not explicitly overruling Rosenbloom, the Court expressly 
backed off the public issue position just three years later in Gertz v. 
Welch, noting that “[t]he extension of the New York Times test pro-
posed by the Rosenbloom plurality would abridge [the] legitimate 
state interest [in providing a legal remedy for defamatory falsehoods] 
to a degree that we find unacceptable.”
  
It appeared that the Court was willing to expand the traditional public 
figure doctrine to include not only an analysis of plaintiff’s status, as a 
public official or public figure, but to also consider whether the pri-
vate individual’s conduct related to matters central to a robust public 
discourse and debate. 
114 A narrow majority refused 
to adopt a position that would subject private individuals to a higher 
evidentiary burden regardless of whether the allegedly defamatory 
speech related to a general or public interest.115 The minority justices, 
however, each filed separate dissents advocating a spectrum of differ-
ent approaches for balancing First Amendment freedoms against the 
right to recover for defamation.116
Justice Brennan’s dissent specifically addresses the situation 
where a private individual alleges defamation in connection with an 
event that is of general or public interest. First, he notes that Rosen-
bloom’s application of the New York Times v. Sullivan standard to 
certain private individuals is appropriate when it involves events of 




 113 Id. at 43-44 (“We honor the commitment to robust debate on public issues, 
which is embodied in the First Amendment, by extending constitutional protection to 
all discussion and communication involving matters of public or general concern, 
without regard to whether the persons involved are famous or anonymous.”). 
 114 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974). 
 115 Justice Blackmun filed a concurrence in order to achieve a narrow 5-4 
majority. Despite agreeing with the plurality in Rosenbloom, Justice Blackmun re-
versed course and voted against the public issue standard in order to eliminate uncer-
tainty in defamation law, stating “[i]f my vote were not needed to create a majority, I 
would adhere to my prior view.” Id. at 354. 
 116 See id. at 354-403. On one extreme, Justice Douglas expressed the view 
“that the First Amendment would bar Congress from passing any libel law.” Id. at 356 
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 117 Id. at 361 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 In support of this contention, he states 
that the “guarantees of free speech and press necessarily reach far 
more than knowledge and debate about the strictly official activities of 
2011] DEFAMATION OR DISCOURSE? 27 
various levels of government, for freedom of discussion, if it would 
fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about 
which information is needed….”118 Further, Justice Brennan did not 
find it necessary to limit the analysis to the plaintiff’s status as a pub-
lic official or figure because issues of public or general interest do not 
become less important in First Amendment discourse simply because 
a private individual is involved.119
In responding to the majority, Justice Brennan notes that the tradi-
tional justifications for excluding a private plaintiff from the New 
York Times v. Sullivan standard—voluntariness and access to modes 
of communication—do not adequately reflect the reality of society 
and do not sufficiently protect important First Amendment freedoms. 
For example, citing to his position in Rosenbloom, he notes that while 
certain prominent public figures may have some ability to command 
media attention, “even then it is the rare case where the denial takes 
over the original charge. Denials, retractions, and corrections are not 
‘hot’ news, and rarely receive the prominence of the original story.”
  
120 
Because there is no guarantee that the media outlets will want to run 
counter-criticism stories, as the subject may no longer be popular, in 
reality there is no concrete ability of public figures to command the 
media outlets.121 Additionally, Justice Brennan rejects the majority’s 
reliance on the voluntary aspect of plaintiff’s position in determining 
defamation recovery in conjunction with the First Amendment. He 
expresses the view that “[s]ocial interaction exposes all of us to some 
degree of public view” and notes that the Court, “has observed that 
‘[t]he risk of this exposure is an essential incident of life in a society 
which places a primary value on the freedom of speech and of 
press.’”122
Lastly, for Justice Brennan, allowing courts to determine what is 
and what is not an issue of general or public interest is not totally out-





 118 Id. at 362 (citations omitted). 
 119 Id.  
 120 Id. at 363 (citing Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 46-47 
(1971)). 
 121 Id. (“In the vast majority of libels involving public officials or public 
figures, the ability to respond through media will depend on the same complex factor 
on which the ability of a private individual depends: the unpredictable event of the 
media’s continuing interest in the story.”) (citation omitted). 
 122 Id. at 364 (citing Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967)). 
 123 Id. at 368-69. 
 Although defining what constitutes 
issues of general or public interest necessarily requires broad discre-
tion by judges, Justice Brennan pointed to the voluminous case law, 
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both before and after Rosenbloom, as guidance. Further, he noted that 
“[t]he public interest is necessarily broad; any residual self-censorship 
that may result from the uncertain contours of the ‘general or public 
interest’ concept should be of far less concern to publishers and 
broadcasters than that occasioned by state laws imposing liability for 
negligent falsehood.”124
The Supreme Court created the original public figure doctrine 
during an era when traditional media sources dominated and plaintiffs 
typically had to take some action to enter into the public spotlight. 
However, classifying a plaintiff as a public figure in a defamation 
action has become considerably more complex when considering the 
digitization of today’s society. Most people have put themselves on-
line in some form, including social and professional networking, 
blogging, or participating in online chat rooms. Thus, the voluntari-
ness aspect of the traditional public figure doctrine may not have the 
same force as it did when the Court decided New York Times v. Sulli-
van. Similar to the principles indicated in Justice Brennan’s dissent in 
Gertz, reliance on a plaintiff’s access to media simply cannot carry the 
same weight as before because of the ease of accessibility provided by 
the Internet
 Under the general or public interest approach, 
the potential harms resulting from a broad definition of public inter-
est—and thus an increased application of the New York Times v. Sulli-
van standard—is far less harmful than the effects of allowing private 
plaintiffs to allege mere negligence in order to recover for defamation, 
especially when the speech relates to important public discourse. 
125
There are two main principles underlying the traditional public 
figure doctrine: (1) the voluntary nature of the plaintiff’s position or 
actions, and (2) the plaintiff’s access to channels of communication 
used to counteract negative speech.
 and the reality that all counter-criticisms responses will 
not meet their target because of the sheer amount of information 
available. Thus, from a First Amendment perspective, it is increasing-
ly imperative that the Supreme Court reevaluate its defamation juri-
sprudence, moving the analysis away from reliance on the status of 
the plaintiff towards a determination of whether the speech involves 
an issue of general or public interest. 
IV. INTERNET PUBLIC FIGURE DOCTRINE 
126
  
 124 Id. at 369. 
 125 See discussion supra part I. 
 126 See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 However, while commentators 
recognize that the Internet has split access to public discourse wide 
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open,127 there is stark disagreement about how to classify individual 
plaintiffs as private figures, voluntary public figures, involuntary pub-
lic figures, or limited-purpose public figures.128 Classification as a 
public figure is critical in the context of Internet defamation suits be-
cause the Supreme Court explicitly recognizes that there is a heigh-
tened evidentiary burden for plaintiffs who are categorized as public 
figures129 and, consequently, this evidentiary burden is crucial for a 
plaintiff in overcoming a motion to quash a John Doe Subpoena. The 
standards used by courts in analyzing John Doe Subpoenas test the 
sufficiency of a plaintiff’s defamation claim using various procedural 
proxies including, good faith, motion to dismiss, prima facie and 
summary judgment.130
In addition to the pleading requirement, some commentators em-
phasize that the underlying rationales supporting the public figure 
doctrine—voluntariness and access to communication—are not neces-
sarily as strong in the context of the Internet.
 Thus, if a plaintiff is considered an Internet 
public figure, then he or she will have to plead enough facts to show 
that the alleged defamer acted with actual malice to satisfy the requi-
site procedural mechanism.  
131
  
 127 See, e.g., Lidsky, Silencing John Doe, supra note 1, at 893 (discussing 
how access to the Internet has affected ability to engage in public discourse).  
 128 Compare Gleicher, supra note 11, at 335-37 (arguing that failure to main-
tain a narrow definition of public figures online would result in reduced legal protec-
tion for plaintiffs who did not possess a remedial advantage to combat negative 
speech and did not voluntarily assume a public position), and Michael Hadley, Note, 
The Gertz Doctrine and Internet Defamation, 84 VA. L. REV. 477, 490-501 (1998) 
(rejecting the argument that all Internet users should be considered public figures), 
with Mike Goodwin, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 4 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. 
L. REV. 1, 8 (1994) (arguing that the availability of the mass medium makes all Inter-
net users public figures), and Miller, supra note 13, at 256-57 (arguing that a courts 
should maintain a broad definition of public figures online). 
 129 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80 (Under this heightened standard, a plaintiff 
who is considered a public official must establish that “the statement was made with 
‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of 
whether it was false or not.”). 
 130 See, e.g., Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 579 (N.D. 
Cal. 1999) (motion to dismiss); Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 461 (Del. 2005) (sum-
mary judgment); Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No.3, 775 A.2d 756, 760-61 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2001) (prima facie); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc. 
(In re AOL), No. 40570, 2000 WL 1210372, at *8 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 2000), rev’d 
on other grounds sub nom. Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 
S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001) (good faith). 
 131 See Gleicher, supra note 11, at 334-36. 
 These critics argue 
that a broad definition of Internet public figures is contrary to the 
principles underlying traditional defamation law because it is difficult, 
if not impossible, to predict when and if someone will gain Internet 
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notoriety.132 They argue that people obtain Internet popularity without 
taking any active steps to achieve that status,133 which seems inconsis-
tent with the justification that the evidentiary burden in defamation 
claims should be higher for plaintiffs who voluntarily assume the risk 
of public commentary and criticism. Further, critics of a broad defini-
tion argue that because most people have essentially the same access 
to the channels of Internet communication, the public figure possesses 
no real advantage over the private individual to remedy the reputa-
tional injury resulting from defamatory speech.134
Under an expanded definition of a limited-purpose public figure, 
users would be considered public figures for all online activities relat-
ing to the user’s participation in matters of public concern. If a user 
maintains a social networking page, participates in a political forum, 
or produces a personal blog, then the court should consider the plain-
tiff to be a limited-purpose public figure for any statements concern-
  
However, increased accessibility encourages Internet users to un-
dertake some voluntary action to inject themselves into online dis-
course. Thus, critics of a broad definition cannot rely on the tradition-
al justifications of the public figure doctrine as a counterargument for 
an expanded definition of the Internet public figure doctrine because it 
does not align with the realities of the today’s society. While some 
private individuals will inevitably be subject to involuntary public 
notoriety, the reality of interaction and activity on the Internet is prob-
ably more reflective of an active choice on behalf of the user to put 
their identity into cyberspace. Further, in an era in which traditional 
media sources are becoming a scarcity and important public discourse 
is hashed out on the Internet, the general or public interest approach, 
as opposed to the complicated analysis of a plaintiff’s status, is both a 
more manageable standard for courts and is necessary for the protec-
tion of important First Amendment freedoms. This Note proposes the 
creation of an Internet public figure doctrine that uses aspects of both 
the majority and dissenting opinions in Gertz, focusing on an ex-
panded definition of limited-purpose public figures and the considera-
tion of whether or not the speech relates to an issue of general or pub-
lic interest.  
  
 132 Id. at 335 (arguing that the lack of proactive steps required to become an 
Internet public figure “undermines the notion of voluntary accession to publicity that 
is inherent in the public figure doctrine”). 
 133 See discussion supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 134 Gleicher, supra note 11, at 334-36; see also Hadley, supra note 128, at 
492-95 (arguing that the right to reply is not as meaningful on the Internet because 
while there is the ability to instantaneously respond in one’s own words, it still re-
quires an affirmative step to log on to the website to receive the reply). 
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ing a public issue made in relation to the user’s voluntary online activ-
ity. For example, if a person sets up a Facebook page with links to 
various blogs she participates in, then she has created an online identi-
ty incorporating these various voluntary Internet activities. And, if she 
uses one of these resources to discuss her recent failure to secure a 
promotion at work because she was female and someone comments 
that she should have slept with even more of her superiors, then the 
court should consider her a limited-purpose public figure in a suit for 
defamation. Under this expanded view she would be a limited-purpose 
public figure for two reasons: (1) she voluntarily entered the public 
forum by creating various online identities, and (2) she used these 
outlets to inject herself into the public debate over gender issues in the 
workplace, in order to influence, or simply participate, in the resolu-
tion of a public issue. 
If Internet users are considered limited-purpose public figures for 
their voluntary online activities, then some plaintiffs will have to offer 
evidence that the alleged defamer acted with the New York Times v. 
Sullivan standard of actual malice. Critics argue that this approach is 
flawed for various reasons. First, expanding the definition of limited-
purpose public figures on the Internet would led to a disparate result 
between online plaintiffs and offline plaintiffs in a defamation suit.135 
Specifically, offline plaintiffs, who are not considered public figures 
under the traditional analysis, would have a lower evidentiary burden 
in seeking the identity of his or her alleged defamer than an online 
plaintiff who alleges defamation with regard to his or her Internet 
activity.136 However, this argument fails to consider the vast changes 
in media and communications since the era of New York Times v. Sul-
livan. The traditional public figure doctrine relies on concepts of vo-
luntariness and access to communications that are no longer relevant 
considerations for the Internet era.137
  
 135 See Chilson, supra note 45, at 398-99.  
 136 Id. 
 137 The Internet requires that users take some voluntary action to engage in 
online activities and thus, the notion that plaintiff has voluntarily assumed the risk of 
criticism under the traditional public figure analysis is no longer a reliable indicator. 
Because the Internet provides free access to anyone with an Internet connection, the 
status of the plaintiff is not necessary to reach modes of communication to counter the 
criticism. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 361-65 (1974) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (describing how the “access to modes of communication” justification for 
classification as a public figure is flawed in terms of the realistic ability to counteract 
the negative comments). 
 Because the Internet creates a 
unique forum that encourages voluntary participation and eliminates 
the need for status to secure access to modes of communication, the 
argument that the analysis would be different for offline versus online 
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plaintiffs is form rather than substance. Thus, the criticism that an 
expanded definition of limited-purpose public figure creates two sepa-
rate standards for defamation misses the point because the Internet 
requires the Court to consider the inadequacy of the traditional public 
figure analysis in order to adequately protected First Amendment 
freedoms in the online context. 
Critics also argue that an expansion of the limited-purpose public 
figure doctrine would persuade some people not to engage in online 
discourse because of the fear that they would not be able to recover, 
due to the heightened evidentiary burden, in the event that their repu-
tation was defamed.138 Practically speaking, critics argue that this 
would create a disincentive that would effectively “chill” some level 
of speech because online plaintiffs would have to allege actual malice 
to recover for defamation which would dissuade them from participat-
ing in online discourse. However, in reality the actual malice standard, 
arguably, has not had an effect on the private individual’s decision to 
run for public office,139
This argument rests on the speculative premise that people value 
the right to an untarnished reputation over the desire to participate in 
public debate and discourse. For example, under this argument’s ra-
tionale, a private individual would be reluctant to post commentary on 
a city’s website forum regarding education cuts out of fear that, under 
the expanded limited-purpose public figure definition, they may have 
to allege actual malice in the future should another user defame him. 
However, it is unlikely that a person would engage in such an internal 
hypothetical litigation debate before participating in a discussion re-
garding an issue that has real consequences on the person’s life. Fur-
ther, because of the economic downturn, traditional media has under-
gone an unprecedented transition into the digital realm
 and there is no reason to believe that it would 
produce a chilling effect in the Internet context either.  
140
  
 138 See Gleicher, supra note 11, at 335 (arguing that “[f]aced with reduced 
legal protection, potential speakers may avoid speaking if they risk transforming 
themselves into public figures”); Hadley, supra note 128, at 500 (“By simply entering 
the Internet, a person would subject herself to the New York Times actual malice 
standard. This creates a strong incentive to stay off the information superhighway.”). 
 139 Hadley, supra note 128, at 500 (“In all fairness this incentive [to stay off 
the Internet because of the fear of heightened burden] should not be overstated—the 
increased scrutiny of public officials under New York Times has not prevented eve-
ryone from running for office. The same may be true for users of the Internet.”) (foot-
note omitted). 
 140 See David Carr, Mourning Old Media’s Decline, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 
2008, at B1. 
 and the pub-
lic discourse regarding many important issues has manifested itself 
online. Thus, the argument that the expansion of the public figure 
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doctrine would discourage users from participating online because 
they would have a higher evidentiary burden is a stretch.  
Despite advocating for an expansion of the limited-purpose public 
figure on the Internet, the issue is considerably more complex when 
considering plaintiffs who are truly involuntary public figures. While 
this argument may seem superfluous in light of the fact that many 
people have put themselves online in the professional, social or politi-
cal context, there are still rare occasions when an individual is invo-
luntarily thrust into the online public forum. The Internet notoriety 
surrounding a boy who taped himself doing moves from the Star Wars 
movies, which was later published without his permission by fellow 
classmates, illustrates an obvious example of a true involuntary public 
figure. Before long, the video went “viral” and the boy became known 
as the “Star Wars Kid.”141
Under the general or public interest approach advocated by Justice 
Brennan in his Gertz
 Because the “Star Wars Kid” did not volun-
tarily inject himself into a public controversy, an application of the 
limited-purpose public figure framework is misplaced. And there is 
considerable support for the argument that adopting a general or pub-
lic interest approach and requiring him to allege actual malice would 
be patently unfair under the circumstances.  
Courts, however, should not adopt a blanket rejection of the gen-
eral or public issue framework to involuntary public figures because 
doing so may foreclose important public discourse. Consider the fol-
lowing example: a lesbian student wants to attend senior prom with a 
female date, but is turned away by parents at the door and the whole 
incident is recorded using a cell phone camera. A few days later 
someone posts this footage on YouTube without the student’s permis-
sion or knowledge (assume for this hypothetical that the student has 
not engaged in any online activity, such as Facebook, discussing this 
issue). The girl becomes an Internet celebrity and websites are created 
to discuss the issue of whether schools should be allowed to adopt 
anti-gay policies at school functions. Some of the posts contain dero-
gatory remarks about the girl regarding her lesbian lifestyle. 
 
  
 141 See ‘Star Wars Kid’ Becomes Unwilling Internet Star, USA TODAY, Aug. 
21, 2003, available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/webguide/internetlife/2003-08-
21-star-wars-kid_x.htm (describing the notoriety surrounding the video despite the 
fact that the boy did not volunteer the video for Internet publication). 
dissent, the student may have to allege actual 
malice against her alleged defamers if the court determines that the 
statements relate to a matter of public concern—gay and lesbian 
rights. Thus, the real issue is how the courts define general or public 
issue. If they define it broadly to include anything that sparks the pub-
lic interest, then even the “Star Wars Kid” would likely have to allege 
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actual malice. On the other hand, if the courts follow the rationale in 
the limited-purpose public figure jurisprudence and limit the defini-
tion to issues related to the public controversy,142
From a speech protective perspective, the Court should define 
general or public interest broadly to ensure that all opinions, even 
those disfavored or taboo, are part of the online public discourse and 
debate. Even though a broad definition would seemingly put an undue 
burden on plaintiffs like the female student, perhaps protecting those 
rights is better left for laws specifically targeted towards this kind of 
unwanted conduct, such as cyber bullying legislation.
 then any interest in 
the “Star Wars Kid” would likely fall outside the bounds requiring a 
heightened burden, but interest in the lesbian student would be in-
cluded.  
143
The Internet offers an unprecedented medium for First Amend-
ment speech, allowing the average user to reach a vast audience 
beyond the scope of what the Framers could have ever comprehended. 
Traditional sources of print and broadcast communication continue to 
fade away and yesterday’s pamphleteer is replaced by today’s blog-
 
It is time for the Supreme Court to reconsider the principles un-
derlying the traditional public figure doctrine in the context of the 
Internet. Reliance on the voluntary aspect of plaintiff’s position in the 
public spotlight does not need to be completely abandoned, but simply 
modified to recognize the expanded prevalence of limited-purpose 
public figures on the Internet. Further, even in the absence of volunta-
ry action the Court should hesitate to apply a blanket prohibition of 
actual malice for involuntary plaintiff when the statements relate to an 
issue of general or public concern. In recognizing the need to protect 
issues of general or public concern, the Court can resurrect the Rosen-
bloom doctrine, without eviscerating online defamation claims by 
limiting the New York Times v. Sullivan standard to issues that reflect 
public controversy. Readjusting the Gertz definition of a limited-
purpose public figure to meet the concerns of an Internet driven socie-
ty, as well as recognizing the importance of public discourse regard-
less of the voluntary action, adequately reflects the current concerns 
regarding online defamation and is necessary to protect important 
First Amendment freedoms. 
V. CONCLUSION 
  
 142 See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976). 
 143 See generally Kevin Turbert, Note, Faceless Bullies: Legislative and Judi-
cial Responses to Cyberbullying, 33 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 651 (2009) (discussing the 
judicial response to cyberbullying and possible legislative responses). 
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ger. Despite the vast changes in the method of delivering one’s mes-
sage, the underlying importance of the right to speak anonymously is 
equally, if not more, important in the Internet context as it was 
throughout the history of First Amendment jurisprudence. In reality, 
the Internet provides a unique forum for critical public discourse with 
virtually no obstacles to user accessibility. Further, the ability to dis-
seminate ideas anonymously without fear of reprisal allows the Inter-
net to provide an outlet for important high value speech. However, not 
all online speech is deserving of robust First Amendment protection 
and sometimes an individual plaintiff is entitled to recover for reputa-
tional injury. The critical issue arises in deciding how to balance an 
individual’s right to anonymous speech with the plaintiff’s right to 
recover for cognizable harm.  
Because online anonymous speech can often involve critical First 
Amendment freedoms, it is important for the courts to develop a uni-
form standard that allows both plaintiffs and defendants to predict 
what kinds of conduct will be subject to liability. To this point, most 
commentators have focused on the relative strengths and weaknesses 
of the various tests for granting John Doe Subpoenas. While analysis 
of these procedural mechanisms is undoubtedly important, it misses 
the fundamental point that the traditional public figure doctrine is no 
longer sufficient in the modern Internet age. In adopting a uniform 
approach, courts need to consider the inadequacies of the New York 
Times v. Sullivan standard when applied to the reality of today’s In-
ternet user. A modification of the traditional public figure doctrine 
that incorporates relevant online characteristics, such as the expansion 
of limited purpose public figures based on voluntary online activity is 
a step in the right direction. Further, beyond the classification of the 
plaintiff, it is important for courts to consider whether or not the 
speech underlying the claim relates to a matter of general or public 
interest in order to ensure robust First Amendment protection on the 
Internet. Thus, under the Internet public figure doctrine, certain online 
plaintiffs would have to meet a higher evidentiary burden in order to 
recover for defamation. Allowing the courts to consider whether the 
conduct relates to an issue of general or public concern is necessary to 
ensure that important First Amendment freedoms are adequately pro-
tected in this new and dominant medium. 
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